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GIMME SHELTER:
HOW THE ACCOUNTANT’S CONTINGENCY FEE
AND THE ATTORNEY’S OPINION LETTER
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROLIFERATION OF
ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has often been said that the only things certain in life are death and
taxes.1 However, the certainty of paying taxes is decreasing as a result of
the growing prevalence of tax shelters.2 Congress, in the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997,3 has defined a tax shelter where the “purpose of . . . [an]
entity, plan or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income
tax.”4 Generally, a tax shelter is understood to be an arrangement that
generates “losses” on paper in order to offset income and the corresponding
“tax liability.”5 This is not to suggest that tax shelters are a new phenomenon.6 Rather, the popularity and acceptance of tax shelters seems to have
increased.7 While there are legal ways to minimize one’s tax liabilities,
abusive tax shelters are typically understood to “involve transactions that, if
the facts were known, would not be upheld in court.”8 One principal adverse effect of abusive tax shelters is that the federal government is denied
vast funds due to the underreporting of taxable income.9 In addition, tax

1. See CHRISTINE AMMER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS 158
(indicating that Benjamin Franklin was the first to use this well-known phrase).
2. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 78 (2006) (attributing the increase in abusive tax shelters to the
“financial boom of the 1990s”).
3. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4. See Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes and Abusive Transactions: Why Today’s
Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients To “Just Say No,” 707 PLI/TAX 9, 14
(relying on 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (d)(2)(C) (2006)).
5. See Joe M. Chambers, New Developments in the Fight Against Tax Shelters: Unethical
Behavior Under Fire, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 117, 117 (2006) (“[T]hese transactions have no
economic purpose . . . except to create losses to offset taxable income.”).
6. See Ben Wang, Supplying the Tax Shelter Industry: Contingent Fee Compensation for
Accountants Spurs Production, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1251 (2003) (indicating that shelters
were also marketed to taxpayers in the 1970s and 1980s).
7. See id. at 1250 (noting that tax shelters have experienced “wildfire growth”). This acceptance seems evident in that some accounting agencies even advertise for the design of tax shelters.
Id. at 1251.
8. Korb, supra note 4, at 15.
9. See Sen. Carl Levin, Levin Bill Would Curb Abusive Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Mar. 26, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 59-48, at *2 (indicating that abusive tax shelters cost the United

262

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:261

shelters “undermine confidence in the fairness of [the United States] tax
system.”10
While there are a number of ways the public’s confidence in the tax
system has eroded,11 or how the United States Department of Treasury is
denied revenue, this note will address the roles of an accountant’s contingency fee and a lawyer’s opinion letter in the abusive tax shelter industry.12
Part II of this note presents an overview of tax shelters, how they are
defined, how they have evolved, and how they are specifically designed.
This section also examines various enforcement techniques. Part III offers
an example of a tax shelter to demonstrate how a tax shelter actually works.
Part IV examines the role of contingency fees and how they fuel the growth
of abusive tax shelters, specifically addressing the problems posed to auditor independence. Part V addresses how attorneys, who are commissioned
to write opinion letters to validate these shelters, provide a façade of legitimacy to abusive tax shelters. Additionally, Part V demonstrates that an
emphasis on professional responsibility can help curb the abusive tax
shelter industry. Finally, Part VI provides solutions to curb these practices
in the tax shelter industry.
II. TAX SHELTERS
Part of the challenge in understanding how tax shelters operate is
determining how a tax shelter is defined.13 Once defined, it is important to
remember that abusive tax shelters are not novel, and that they have
evolved over time in conjunction with the very idea of taxation.14 The
evolution of shelters has led to the increasingly complex design of tax shelters to avoid heavy taxation.15 As a result, judicial doctrines and penalties
developed to counteract abusive tax shelters.16
States Treasury tens of billions of dollars on a yearly basis); see also Wang, supra note 6, at 1237
(estimating that annual losses to the Treasury range from $7 million to $30 million).
10. Kenneth A. Gary & Sheryl Stratton, Stiffer Penalties, More Resources Needed to Combat
Tax Shelters, Top Regulators Tell Senate, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 21, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT
225-1, at *3 (quoting Internal Revenue Service Commissioner, Mark A. Everson).
11. See Levin, supra note 9, at *2 (stating that tax shelter abuses shift “the tax burden from
high income corporations and individuals onto the backs of the middle class,” and implying that if
the middle class is going to adhere to its responsibility to pay its taxes, so should corporations and
high-income individuals).
12. See Wang, supra note 6, at 1252 (explaining that a tax shelter is often accompanied by an
attorney-authored opinion letter that acts as “insurance against tax penalties in case of a successful
IRS attack”).
13. Korb, supra note 4, at 14.
14. Id.
15. Wang, supra note 6, at 1250-52; Korb, supra note 4, at 13-14.
16. Elena Eracleous, Losing the Audit Lottery: Corporate Tax Shelters and Judicial
Doctrine, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 205, 209-10 (2000).
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A. DEFINITION
One of the primary hurdles facing those in the regulatory capacity,
such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), that attempt to curb the abusive
tax shelter industry is defining what, exactly, is a tax shelter.17 In fact,
some scholars and judges have linked the tax shelter definitional problem
with that of obscenity—they know it when they see it.18 A tax shelter
might involve “an elaborate series of formal steps [or transactions] . . .
contrived to [attain] . . . an unreasonably beneficial tax result.”19 But a tax
shelter usually takes advantage of a “loophole” in the law.20
B. EVOLUTION OF TAX SHELTERS
Taxpayers have attempted to minimize their tax liability ever since the
idea of taxes came to fruition.21 Taxpayers sought to achieve this goal
through the use of tax shelters.22 For example, one of the earliest attempts
to minimize taxes was in ancient Rome, where farmers would transfer their
lands to larger landowners, thereby ridding themselves of tax obligations.23
This trend of tax avoidance continued into the Middle Ages in places like
Syria where taxes could be avoided by converting to Islam.24 Similarly,
seventeenth century Russia was forced to change its laws when landlords
and serfs conspired to transfer land from the latter to the former to minimize taxes.25 In the early nineteenth century, homeowners in Charleston,
17. Korb, supra note 4, at 14.
18. Id. See generally Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(providing the first use of the phrase “I know it when I see it” in reference to obscenity).
19. Cecilia Chui, Regulations Against Corporate Tax Shelters: Should We Keep Them?, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 509, 511-12 (2002) (quoting Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective
On Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 48 (2001)).
20. See Michael Hamersley, KPMG ‘Whistleblower’ Testifies At Finance Hearing on Tax
Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 22, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 204-35, at *2 (opining that “most
tax shelters involve some contortion of the law,” and such contortion of the law is often characterized by tax shelter promoters as a “loophole” even though Congress never intended a result
where the law would be twisted beyond its “intended bounds”).
21. Korb, supra note 4, at 13.
22. Id.
23. See id. (explaining that small farm-owners would transfer their land to larger landowners
without forfeiting much in respect to their everyday needs). The small landowners would not lose
any rights to their previously occupied house, land, or animals; they would only lose their obligation to pay the taxes. Id. (citing CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES
ON THE COURSE OF CIVILIZATION 113-14 (1994)).
24. See id. at 13 (illustrating that when countries such as Syria and Egypt offered landowners
an opportunity to forego the land tax if they became Muslims, the conversions to Islam were so
large that it robbed the area of a vast portion of their tax revenue).
25. See id. at 13-14 (relying on Adams’ examples where a landlord would take on a peasant’s debt, financing the peasant himself, and since taxes were based on the poll census, these new
serfs would not be taxed because they were not on the census).

264

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:261

South Carolina, were subject to real estate taxes that were computed based
on a house’s footage that ran along the street.26 For example, a house that
was seventy feet wide would pay higher taxes than a house that was only
thirty-five feet wide.27 This tax scheme led to a number of houses that
might only be “10 [feet] wide but 80 or even 100 [feet] deep.”28 Of course,
a long, narrow house would incur very low taxes because of its ten-foot
width, but it was not very practical if the house was a perfect rectangle, and
it was for that reason that many houses may have maintained a small width
which would have expanded as the house lengthened.29
C. DESIGN OF TAX SHELTERS
Tax shelters were once considered to be tax-planning tools for only the
wealthy.30 However, that notion has long been replaced by the reality that
tax shelters are now a “thriving industry . . . being peddled, sometimes in
cold-call pitches, to thousands of companies.”31 While the United States’
battle with tax shelters dates back to the 1930s, the fight came to a head
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986,32 which was implemented to eliminate
tax shelters altogether.33 The shelters designed after the 1986 Act resulted
in transactions that involved the use of complex financial instruments that
took advantage of ambiguities or inconstancies in the law.34 Such transactions were not intended when Congress enacted the act.35 The complex
financial instruments came to be known as tax products, where a promoter
would pitch the product to unsolicited individuals who could become

26. Id. at 14.
27. Korb, supra note 4, at 14.
28. Id. From the text offered by Korb, it appears these houses would simply be abnormally
long rectangles. See id. Whether correct or not, a tax schemer in this instance might build his
house in more of a trapezoid-like shape, where the side fronting the street is quite narrow, but the
house’s width enlarges the further in you go, much like the infield of a baseball diamond. See id.
29. See id. Therefore, a trapezoid-shaped house would maximize tax savings as well as
living space.
30. Wang, supra note 6, at 1249.
31. See id. at 1250 (describing the current phenomenon of tax shelters as a collection of tax
professionals “distort[ing] the tax system” as a result of their “multimillion dollar tax savings and
multimillion dollar fees”). Regardless, this “hustling” now seems to be accepted. Id. Tax shelters are both utilized by individual taxpayers and corporations. Id. Distinguishing between the
two is not important for purposes of this note.
32. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 110 Stat 2085.
33. See Korb, supra note 4, at 15-16, 22 (noting that with the Revenue Act of 1937, the
Roosevelt Administration tried to shore up the Code by closing a number of loopholes and
explaining that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was intended to eliminate tax shelters directed at
individuals). Also, the minimum-mandatory tax originated in 1969 after twenty-one millionaires
paid no taxes in 1967. Id. at 15-16.
34. Korb, supra note 4, at 23.
35. Id.
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potential clients.36 Subsequently, these tax products were peddled to both
current and prospective clients.37 While the various tax products were often
replicated numerous times, they were usually shrouded in confidentiality
agreements in an effort to remain undetected by the IRS.38 However, the
complexity of tax shelter design has not discouraged enforcement personnel
from attempting to halt the spread of abusive tax shelters.39
D. EFFORTS TO CURB TAX SHELTERS
Courts have developed judicial doctrines in order to combat the
abusive tax shelter dilemma.40 These judicial doctrines were designed to
supplement the disclosure requirements and penalties already in place by
the IRS.41 Collectively, judicial doctrines and penalties are part of a larger
congressional effort to curb the tax shelter industry.42
1.

Judicial Doctrines

Courts have developed judicial doctrines to hinder the spread of abusive tax shelters.43 The two most commonly used judicial doctrines include
the economic substance and the business purpose doctrines.44 These judicial doctrines were developed as a result of the problem that many had in
defining tax shelters, and they provided the courts and the IRS with some
leeway to determine whether tax shelters were being designed solely for tax

36. Id. at 22-23; see also Wang, supra note 6, at 1251 (“[T]oday’s tax shelter promoters
parse the numerous weaknesses in the tax code and devise schemes that can be pitched as
‘products’ to corporate prospects, . . . promoters sell . . . methodically and aggressively.”). Wang
defines the term “tax product” as “a device that exists solely to avoid taxes.” Id. at 1252. A
promoter is generally understood to be one that develops these tax products for sale to individuals
or corporations, the promoter might be an accounting firm, a bank, or even a law firm, though
“most . . . observers believe that accounting firms hold the lion’s share of the market.” Id.
37. Korb, supra note 4, at 23.
38. See id. at 23 (noting that promoters sometimes even forbid clients from showing the
product to the client’s own lawyers, unless the lawyer also agreed to the confidentiality agreement
terms).
39. See Eracleous, supra note 16, at 209-10 (noting that judicial doctrines and other
congressional legislation have been developed to address the tax shelter problem).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 218-19, 228-29.
42. Id. at 209-10.
43. See id. (noting that these judicial doctrines are the legal response to tax shelters).
44. Id. at 209.

266

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:261

purposes.45 A transaction must hold both economic substance and a
business purpose to avoid being deemed an abusive tax shelter.46
Created by the United States Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, 47
the economic substance doctrine states, “a transaction, or a series of transactions, will not be respected for tax purposes unless the transaction has
‘economic substance separate and distinct from the economic benefit
achieved solely by the tax reduction.’”48 With a specific transaction, the
economic substance doctrine analyzes the pre-tax profit potential in relation
to the tax benefits expected.49 In applying the economic substance doctrine,
courts often consider whether the transaction’s only purpose is to achieve
the tax benefits desired, and whether a profit will arise from the
transaction.50
With a different moniker, the business purpose doctrine attempts to
achieve the same goal as the economic substance doctrine.51 The United
States Supreme Court in Gregory required that the transaction hold a
business purpose.52 The business purpose must exist separately from the
expected tax benefits.53 More specifically, the tax court in ACM
Partnership v. Commissioner54 required that the transaction be rationally
related to a “useful non-tax purpose.”55 In summation, the business purpose

45. See Rostain, supra note 2, at 84 (implying that since shelters are difficult to define,
doctrines allow a court to examine a series of transactions in a more global manner, making it
easier to determine if the transaction constitutes an abusive tax shelter).
46. Stuart W. Gray, Controlling Foreign Tax Credit Abuse: The “Economic Substance”
Test, 13 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 729, 751-52 (1999).
47. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
48. Gray, supra note 46, at 745-46 (citing ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189,
2215 (1997), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 231, 249 (1998)).
49. See Eracleous, supra note 16, at 209-10 (“[T]ax benefits may be denied if they ‘arise
position’” (citing Dep’t of the Treas., The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Discussion,
Analysis and Legislative Proposals, 99 TAX NOTES TODAY, July 1, 1999, LEXIS, 99 TNT 12713)).
50. See Gray, supra note 46, at 748 (explaining that in determining whether a transaction
possesses economic substance, one can look to a two-pronged approach that developed from
earlier cases). The two prongs are: (1) that the only purpose was to obtain tax benefits; and (2)
“that the transaction has no . . . reasonable possibility of profit.” Id.
51. Eracleous, supra note 16, at 213-14.
52. Id. at 213.
53. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (holding that a business purpose
did not exist); see also Eracleous, supra note 16, at 213 (explaining that while a taxpayer can
attempt to minimize his taxes within the law, the business purpose doctrine attempts to determine
if such minimization occurred as the statute intended).
54. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1991).
55. ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 253.
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doctrine requires that the transaction have a business purpose aside from the
desired or intended tax consequences.56
2.

Penalties

While judicial doctrines aid the IRS in its efforts to curb abusive tax
shelters, the imposition of penalties also provides a level of deterrence.57
When a taxpayer’s actions have resulted in underpayment, an accuracyrelated penalty equal to twenty percent of the underpayment is assessed.58
Additionally, if it has been determined that the taxpayer’s transaction in
question lacked economic substance or a business purpose, the taxpayer
will likely be penalized, even if the transaction was based on the advice of a
tax advisor.59 While these penalties are a part of the arsenal of weapons
that can be employed against a taxpayer, some commentators believe this
particular tool is not strong enough to deter abuse, thereby suggesting that
the penalties should be substantially harsher.60 For example, if the tax
shelter is deemed abusive, and the only consequence of this determination
is that the individual has to pay what he was supposed to pay in the first
place, that is, had he not used an abusive tax shelter, then the prevailing
attitude is “[s]o [what], why not give it a try?”61 However, if the taxpayer
were forced to pay a civil penalty in the range of seventy-five percent of his
understated taxable income, perhaps the risk is no longer worth the
reward.62 While penalties are useful tools, taxpayers have developed
creative ways to minimize their tax liabilities, as the next part illustrates.63

56. Id.; see also Rostain, supra note 2, at 85 (explaining that the business purpose doctrine
“reflect[s] a purposive approach to interpreting the tax code”).
57. Eracleous, supra note 16, at 214-15.
58. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a) (2006); Eracleous, supra note 16, at 214. A penalty can be imposed
for the following: negligence of rules or regulations; a “substantial understatement of income tax;”
a misstatement; a “substantial overstatement of pension liabilities;” or an estate or gift tax
valuation understatement. Id. at 214-15. These penalties originated as an attempt to discourage
taxpayers from playing the “audit lottery,” a concept where the possibility that the specific
taxpayer will be audited, in relation to the millions of tax returns filed each year, make one’s
chances of escaping audit possible. Id.
59. See Korb, supra note 4, at 43 (explaining that while there are ways to avoid a penalty,
failure to demonstrate a reasonable cause or improper reliance on an advisor will not save the
taxpayer from the penalty).
60. Gary & Stratton, supra note 10, at *3.
61. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1940 (2005).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1942-46.
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III. AN ILLUSTRATION
The tax court in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner illustrates how the
factors of definition, evolution, and design of tax shelters merge.64 The
ACM Partnership was a collection of three partners, each a subsidiary of a
different entity that was created just prior to the formation of the ACM
Partnership.65 The partnership consisted of Southampton, Kannex, and
Merrill Lynch MLCS, owned by the Colgate-Palmolive Company (Colgate), Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. (ABN), and Merrill Lynch Capital
Services (Merrill Lynch), respectively.66 The partnership formed as a result
of Colgate reporting a long-term capital gain that totaled $104,743,250
from the sale of a Colgate subsidiary.67 Merrill Lynch representatives approached Colgate representatives in regard to establishing a partnership that
would result in capital losses that Colgate could use to offset its capital
gains from the recently sold subsidiary.68
The partnership participated in a series of transactions that allowed it to
recognize a long-term gain in the first year of partnership operation and
then recognize a loss in the following years of operation.69 Based on the

64. See generally ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (addressing a series
of transactions involving tax consequences). But see Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v.
Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 778 (5th Cir. 1999) (giving an example of a tax scheme that withstood an
economic substance test challenge). Compaq undertook a transaction that involved the purchase
and immediate resale of American Depository Receipts (ADRs), which was a trading unit that
signified ownership in a foreign entity. Id. at 779. In Compaq, an investment firm purchased ten
million Royal Dutch ADR’s on behalf of Compaq for $887.6 million, and resold the same ADRs
for $868.4 million about an hour after the investment firm purchased them. Id. at 780. Compaq
was entitled to a dividend of roughly $22.5 million for the time it held the ADRs, owing a tax to
the Netherlands of $3.4 million. Id. This transaction left Compaq with a net gain of about $19.2
million. Id. Compaq then declared a capital loss for the difference between the purchase and
resale price on its United States income tax return, which was approximately $20.7 million. Id.
Compaq used the capital loss to offset a gain it had recognized in the previous year. Id.
While the tax court reasoned that Compaq only entered into the transaction for the expected
tax benefits, the Fifth Circuit determined that the ADR transaction had pre-tax profit, as well as
after-tax profit, leading to a determination that the transaction possessed economic substance. Id.
at 782-86. The court looked at the gain Compaq received from the dividend, $22.5 million, less
the loss of $20.7 million from the resale, and determined that a legitimate profit existed. Id. at
787. Therefore, Compaq’s ADR transaction possessed a “business purpose independent of tax
considerations.” Id.
65. ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 233.
66. Id. Southampton and MLCS were incorporated under Delaware law while Kannex was
incorporated under Netherlands Antilles law. Id. ABN is a major bank in the Netherlands. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1231 (2004) (stating that long-term capital losses can be used to
offset long-term capital gains).
69. ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d. at 237. Testimony from a member of ABN’s legal department
indicated that he understood the formation of the partnership to be one where it would create,
albeit a capital gain initially, a capital loss in the latter portion of the transaction. Id. Therefore,
the heavily involved partner, in year one, would take part in the capital portion of the transaction
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initial contributions of the three partners, the partnership set itself up to
allow this capital gain to be largely attributed, about eighty percent, to
ABN, a foreign entity that paid no United States income tax.70 Once this
step of the plan was completed, ABN left the partnership, leaving
Southampton as a ninety-nine percent partner, and MLCS as the remaining
one percent partner.71 Therefore, ABN would be a partner in year one,
assuming much of the gain from the transaction, but would not be a partner
in year two, leaving almost all of the loss to be absorbed by
Southampton/Colgate.72
With the capital originally contributed by each partner, the partnership
bought notes issued by Citicorp.73 Then, the partnership immediately sold
Citicorp notes to other investors for $140 million in cash and installment
notes, also known as the LIBOR notes.74 These LIBOR notes were payable
over the next five years.75 The partnership recognized a gain from the $140
million in cash, less $29 million for the rated value of the installment
notes.76 This left a capital gain of approximately $111 million, of which
eighty percent was allocated to Dutch Bank and the remaining twenty
percent was allocated to Colgate.77 Thus, Dutch Bank recognized a capital
gain of roughly $90 million and Colgate recognized a capital gain of $20
million.78 In year two, the partnership recovered the remainder of the

and the heavily involved parties, in year two and beyond, would take part in the capital loss
portion of the transaction. Id.
70. See id. at 239 (explaining that after all three partners had contributed their capital,
Kannex would hold an 82.6% share, Southampton would hold a 17.1% share, and MLCS would
hold a 0.3% share in the partnership); see also Korb, supra note 4, at 24 (indicating that through
the use of a foreign bank the transaction could escape United States taxation).
71. See id. (explaining that ABN had the right to redeem its interest in the partnership one
year after its formation). In year one, once the capital gain was recognized, but before the capital
losses were recognized, Colgate would increase its partnership share to ninety-nine percent. Id.
72. Id. at 237-39.
73. Id. at 239.
74. Id. at 240. Before ACM Partnership had even purchased the Citigroup notes, Merrill
Lynch had set up a transaction in which two banks, the Bank of Tokyo (BOT) and Bank Francaise
du Commerce Exterieure (BFCE) would purchase the Citigroup notes that ACM Partnership
would purchase, and it was agreed that the two banks would purchase the $175 million of
Citigroup notes for $140 million cash and $35 million worth of LIBOR notes. Id. LIBOR stands
for London Interbank Offering Rate, which is primarily used in European financial markets. Id. at
234; see also Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 61, at 1944 (explaining that the LIBOR rate is one
that changes on a daily basis, reflecting, among a number of market conditions, loan demand).
75. ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 240; see also Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 61, at 1944
(explaining that the LIBOR notes were payable over a five-year period, on a quarterly basis).
76. ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 242.
77. Id. The partnership could recover about $29 million, and set against the cash gain of
$140 million, the gain was roughly $110 million. Id. The partnership divvied this gain according
to the ownership percentages. Id.
78. Id.
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Citicorp notes, which amounted to about $111 million.79 This was a loss,
and since ABN was no longer a partner, leaving ninety-nine percent of the
partnership to Colgate, Colgate recognized a loss of about $110 million.80
When compared to $20 million in capital gain it recognized in the first year,
Colgate had a net capital loss of roughly $90 million.81 Therefore, it
appeared that ABN gained $90 million in year one, and after year two,
Colgate had a loss of $90 million.82 However, in reality, “neither partner
gained or lost anything.”83
The tax court determined that the transaction did not possess any
economic substance.84 Rather, the tax court found that the partnership engaged in a sham transaction, and that its only purpose was to avoid federal
taxes.85 This is just one example of the great lengths that corporations,
historically, would go to in order to shield income from the United States
Treasury’s coffers.86
IV. CONTINGENCY FEES
One of the driving forces in the tax shelter industry is the use of the
contingency fee.87 Typically charged by accountants, contingency fees
create a problem when they compromise the independence of the auditor/
accountant.88 Furthermore, while accountants have a code of ethics to adhere to, they have found creative ways to circumvent this code of ethics.89

79. Id.; see also Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 61, at 1945 (explaining that the loss was
derived from the $175 million basis in the Citicorp notes, less the $29 million basis recovered in
the year of the sale, against the sale price of $35 million for the LIBOR notes).
80. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 61, at 1945.
81. Id. Recall that Colgate recognized a capital gain of $20 million in the first year of the
partnership from the $140 million cash payment, of which it was only a nineteen percent partner.
Id. Now that it is a ninety-nine percent partner, it had a loss of $110 million, for a net loss of $90
million over the two-year period. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 246-48 (determining that the transaction was lacking in
economic substance, and that the court must “‘look beyond the form of [the] transaction’ to
determine whether it has the ‘economic substance that [its] form represents,’” and furthermore, a
transaction that is “‘devoid of economic substance’ must be disregarded for tax purposes and
‘cannot be the basis for a deductible loss’”).
85. See id. at 248-49 (analyzing the transaction in light of the Economic Sham Analysis).
86. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 61, at 1946.
87. Wang, supra note 6, at 1257.
88. Sheryl Stratton, SEC Looks at Selling Aggressive Products to Audit Clients, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Apr. 3, 2000, LEXIS, 2000 TNT 64-3, at *5.
89. Wang, supra note 6, at 1266-67.
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A. PROBLEMS WITH CONTINGENCY FEES
Accountants play a major role within the tax shelter industry.90
Accountants’ use of contingency fees to sell tax products has helped fuel
the rise of abusive tax shelters, and most observers believe the “Big Four”
lead the way in such abuses.91 Today, the “Big Four” consists of Ernst &
Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte & Touche, and KPMG.92
In exchange for the development of a shelter, or “tax product,” and putting
their reputations on the line, accountants charge a fee contingent upon the
amount of tax a client saves.93 The client is typically a corporation.94 A
number of accounting firms charge contingent fees that range anywhere
from thirty to forty percent of the tax savings.95 The contingent fees
charged by firms will vary based on the originality of the product, meaning,
a more complex or novel product will yield the accounting firm a higher
contingent fee.96 Additionally, once the accounting firm has created the tax
product, it requires very few additional resources to sell another shelter of
this kind, making the contingency fees gathered on subsequent shelter sales
almost pure profit for the accounting firm.97
The potential for huge contingency fees has caused some accounting
firms to make quasi-guarantees regarding the possible tax savings that are
available.98 For example, the accounting firm Deloitte & Touche had a
promotion where it “promised to zero out a company’s taxes for a
contingency fee of thirty percent of the tax savings.”99 However, when
these quasi-guarantees fail to achieve the intended results that parties
anticipated, the parties can become frustrated.100

90. Id. at 1252-54.
91. See id. at 1253 (referring to the largest accounting firms which include the following:
Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte & Touche, and KPMG).
92. Paul Danos, Back to the Big Eight Again, FORBES, Apr. 13, 2007, available at http://
www.forbes.com/opinions/2007/04/12/danos-accounting-bigeight-oped-cx_pd_0413danos.html.
93. See Korb, supra note 4, at 16-24 (explaining the details regarding individual and
corporate tax shelters).
94. Id. at 23-24.
95. See Wang, supra note 6, at 1257 (“[T]he largest driving force behind the wildfire growth
of the tax shelter industry, is the use of contingency fees . . . .”).
96. See id. (explaining that PwC will charge anywhere from eight to thirty percent,
depending on the originality of the product).
97. See id. at 1258 (indicating that once the shelter has been developed, those costs are sunk,
and any future sales have very little, if any, cost in implementing them, which leads to an
increased incentive in selling additional shelters based on the contingency fee).
98. Id. at 1261.
99. Id. The firm must not have felt too confident in the legitimacy of its product, because
while it promised to stand behind the shelter before an audit, it was not willing to do so before a
court. Id.
100. Id. at 1261-62.
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For example, KPMG filed a breach of contract claim against a bank
that failed to pay the contingency fee.101 KPMG alleged that the bank took
advantage of the tax plan and then failed to pay the twenty-five percent
contingency fee.102 There is also the danger of the accounting firm collecting the contingency fees up front, having the tax product deemed to be
improper by the IRS, and then being forced to return the collected fees to
the various clients, as had occurred with PwC.103 Situations like these are
noteworthy since most accounting firms do not want to advertise that they
are developing tax shelters, nor does the client want to draw the IRS’s
attention to the fact that it is engaging in a tax shelter.104 Therefore, the
commencement of a lawsuit seems counterintuitive since even the prevailing party may have further explaining to do before the IRS.105
Contingency fees have had a sine-like existence, and its acceptance has
experienced some ups and downs over time.106 At one time, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) ethics rules contained a
“blanket prohibition” on contingency fees.107 However, in an effort to
encourage greater competition within the market place, the Federal Trade
Commission forced the AICPA to amend this provision in 1990.108 With
that “blanket prohibition” gone, the regulation of an accountant’s use of
contingency fees is left to the AICPA and United States Department of
Treasury’s Circular 230.109 Now that the booming tax shelter industry and
the corresponding contingency fees have filled the pockets of accounting
firms, the AICPA takes the position that amendments curbing the use of
contingency fees will “unreasonably undercut consumer choice in violation
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”110 Essentially, the AICPA seems to
be suggesting that if the government is going to lobby for greater

101. See Wang, supra note 6, at 1261-62 (outlining a plan developed by KPMG that exposed
a loophole in state tax law; the firm had evidently “pitched the idea to an undisclosed number of
banks”).
102. Id. at 1262.
103. See id. at 1261 (explaining that PwC was forced to reimburse its clients between $9 and
$16 million when the tax plan was deemed to be improper).
104. See id. (noting that a whistleblower mailed a detailed copy of letter discussing the tax
shelter to the United States Treasury Department).
105. Id.
106. See generally id. at 1260-65 (discussing the major accounting firms and their
involvement within the industry).
107. See David A. Lifson, AICPA Outlines Its Professional Ethics Rules, TAX NOTES
TODAY, June 1, 2000, LEXIS, 2000 TNT 106-17, at *4 (discussing the “rhetoric” of contingency
fees in the accounting industry, and the role of AICPA ethics Rule 302—Contingency Fees).
108. Id.
109. Wang, supra note 6, at 1262-63; see also Korb, supra note 4, at 50 (“Circular 230
provides regulations governing practice before the [IRS].”).
110. Wang, supra note 6, at 1264.
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competition within the market place, then the government must be willing
to accept some of the side effects of that competition.111
B. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
An additional problem that arises when contingency fees are employed
is the effect the fees have on auditor independence, specifically when
accounting firms sell tax products or tax services to their audit clients.112 If
one of the “Big Four” sells a tax shelter to one of its audit clients, and uses
a contingency fee in the process, then that accounting firm now has a stake
in the financial health of the entity it is auditing.113 If the role of the auditor
is to be an independent reviewer of the client’s financial endeavors, the
independence of that review is compromised when the firm collects a fee
that is contingent on the tax savings that resulted from a plan or a product
that the firm sold to the audit client.114 This lack of objectivity is a serious
problem for the following reasons:
There is great potential for auditor independence violations if the
audit client has implemented one or more corporate tax shelters
and (1) any such corporate tax shelters were developed, promoted,
or participated in by the audit firm or any of its partners, or (2) the
audit firm or any of its partners promoted or otherwise participated
in the same or substantially similar tax shelter.115
The crux of this problem is that it takes away the level of “skepticism”
that is to be employed by auditors, as mandated through the Generally
Accepted Audit Standards.116 When an accounting firm sells a tax product
or tax shelter to an audit client, the auditor is essentially checking “his own
work.”117

111. Id.
112. See Stratton, supra note 88, at *2 (noting the conflict when a firm audits a company’s
financial statements and then sells the business a tax shelter).
113. See id. (opining that a conflict of interest arises when accounting firms “provid[e]
aggressive tax planning to audit clients”).
114. See id. (“[I]f you are . . . an accounting firm and you go to a corporation with a tax
shelter and you are going to get a fee based on a percentage of the tax savings, then you are [less
of a] professional advisor . . . [and more of] a commission salesman.”).
115. See Hamersley, supra note 20, at *5 (relating these concerns to the fact that “it must be
‘probable’ that the tax shelter will succeed on its merits”). Mike Hamersley was a Senior Manager in KPMG’s Los Angeles Mergers and Acquisitions Tax Practice, and he was a whistleblower
on KPMG’s abusive tax shelter practices. Id.
116. See id. at *6 (“SEC rules require that auditors of public companies maintain independence in fact and in appearance.”).
117. Id.
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This lack of objectivity likely raises a conflict of interest question.118
For example, the enormous profit potential that results from contingency
fees can cause many auditors to forget about their obligation to “[find]
problems,” and instead “[focus] on looking for opportunities to (sell tax
consulting services).”119 However, accounting firms have been somewhat
novel in circumventing any conflict of interest concerns.120 One such
example is that instead of referring to the fees collected from audit clients
as contingent, accounting firms refer to the fees as “value-based” fees.121 A
value-based fee, within the accounting industry, refers to the firm’s efforts
in “recovering . . . [its] investment in coming up with the idea.”122 Irrespective of what name it is given, it appears that the accounting firm has a stake
in the outcome regardless if a value-based fee or a contingent fee is
charged.123 Thus, whenever a firm “has a propriety interest in the strategy,
it creates a built-in conflict.”124
C. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
Accountants face ethical obligations on a national level from the
AICPA.125 Locally, North Dakota accountants must also adhere to the standards set forth through the North Dakota State Board of Accountancy.126
Examining each of these provides context as to how accountants make
decisions regarding their use of contingency fees.
1.

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct contains a few provisions
regarding contingency fees.127 Specifically, Rule 302.01 governs the use of
contingency fees, prohibiting such fees where the accounting firm or a
member of the accounting firm will conduct an audit or review of that

118. Id.
119. See id. at *7 (“[T]hese individuals were often wearing their tax consulting uniforms
while playing on the audit team.”).
120. Stratton, supra note 88, at *3.
121. See id. (explaining that if the client only pays if the deal is successful, that amounts to a
contingent fee while a “warranty or indemnity . . . or deferral of a portion of the fee until the tax
year is closed without disallowance” is a value-based fee).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Wang, supra note 6, at 1271.
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-02.2-03 (1999).
127. Wang, supra note 6, at 1267.

2007]

NOTE

275

client’s financial statement.128 While the rule addresses the use of contingency fees for audit clients in a fairly clear manner, it does not discuss the
use of contingency fees for nonaudit clients.129 The ethics rule clearly
prohibits the use of contingency fees with regard to audit clients, but the
rule fails to address the general use of contingency fees in the design or
promotion of tax shelters, irrespective of whether the client is an audit or
nonaudit client.130 Furthermore, if a member of the accounting profession
wishes to charge a contingency fee to an audit client, that member might
deem it to be a value-based fee, in the hope of avoiding Rule 302.131
Although the AICPA’s Ethics Rule 302.01 provides a solid basis for
limiting the use of contingency fees, it does not have the teeth to effectively
curb the effects that contingency fees have on the tax shelter industry.132
The rule needs two amendments in order to carry any clout: for one, it
needs to prohibit contingency fees between audit and nonaudit clients alike;
and two, it needs to draw no distinction when a fee is labeled contingent,
value-based, or otherwise.133
2.

North Dakota State Board of Accountancy

The state of North Dakota has adopted the AICPA’s Ethics Rule 302,
codifying it as section 3-04-04-02 of the North Dakota Administrative
Code.134 In its imitation of AICPA 302, the North Dakota statute faces the
same challenges because it fails to address the role contingency fees play in

128. See AICPA CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 302.01 (1991), available at
http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/et_302.html (giving the direction of when a contingency fee
should not be charged). The rule provides:
Rule 302—Contingent fees. A member in public practice shall not (1) Perform for a
contingent fee any professional services for, or receive such a fee from a client for
whom the member or the member’s firm performs, (a) an audit or review of a
financial statement . . . or (2) Prepare an original or amended tax return or claim for a
tax refund for a contingent fee for any client.
....
[A] contingent fee is a fee established for the performance of any service pursuant to
an arrangement in which no fee will be charged unless a specified finding or result is
attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise dependent upon the finding or
result of such service. . . . A member’s fees may vary depending, for example, on the
complexity of services rendered.
Id.
129. See Wang, supra note 6, at 1267 (“Clint Stretch, Director of Tax Policy at Deloitte &
Touche, admits there is much greater latitude in the types of fees charged with nonaudit clients.”).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1267.
132. Id. at 1271.
133. See Stratton, supra note 88, at *3 (discussing contingency and value-based fees charged
to audit and nonaudit clients).
134. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 3-04-04-02 (1999).
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the tax shelter industry.135 While section 3-04-04-02 prohibits the use of
contingency fees when the accounting entity is auditing a client, the statute
does not address the use of contingency fees in regard to nonaudit clients.136
Furthermore, the North Dakota statute, similar to the AICPA, fails to
address the concept of alternative terms of contingency fees, and how the
alternative terms are used to skirt the contingency fee-use prohibitions.137
More specifically, the potential exists for any North Dakota accounting firm
to avoid the provision by classifying its efforts as value-based fees.138
While section 3-04-04-02 is better than the alternative of having no applicable statute, more inclusive language in the statute would be instrumental
in curbing the abusive tax shelter industry.139 While the use of contingency
fees play a role in the abusive tax shelter industry, the use of suspect
opinion letters plays a role as well.140
V. OPINION LETTERS
Taxpayers seek an opinion letter from an attorney that will represent
that their tax transaction will survive an IRS inspection; this is particularly
problematic when this representation is false.141 By relying on this representation, taxpayers attempt to shield themselves from liability.142 By
emphasizing the rules of professional responsibility, the dishonest representations in opinion letters can be curtailed.143
A. THE PROBLEM WITH SUSPECT OPINION LETTERS
The accountant is not the only player involved in the creation of a tax
shelter who needs to be monitored.144 There are often many players within
the tax shelter industry, and the attorney plays a role, just as accountants
and other professionals.145 While the attorney is typically not the player
that designs the shelter, he or she is often the individual that gives the shelter its appearance of legitimacy.146 An opinion letter will give the abusive

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Wang, supra note 6, at 1267.
139. See id. at 1272.
140. Id. at 1254.
141. Chambers, supra note 5, at 117-18.
142. Id. at 126.
143. Id. at 118.
144. Wang, supra note 6, at 1252.
145. Id.
146. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 117-18 (indicating that while some attorneys might
participate in the creation or promotion of tax shelters, much of that aspect of the industry is
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tax shelter the appearance of a legitimate transaction.147 In an opinion
letter, an attorney, who is commissioned to write the opinion, states that the
taxpayer has a “reasonable chance of withstanding a challenge by the
IRS.”148 However, there is a potential problem with the issuing of such
opinion letters: if a transaction is likely to fail an IRS challenge, but the
opinion letter is issued regardless, stating that the transaction will survive
the challenge, the opinion letter is both inherently faulty and misleading.149
As a result, an opinion letter’s conclusion, which states that the shelter can
withstand a challenge, is not as determinative as finding someone to author
that conclusion.150 To clarify, shelter opinion letters provide the taxpayer
with a level of protection; if a taxpayer relies upon the opinion in making
his decision to proceed with the shelter, the opinion makes it difficult to
determine whether the taxpayer “willfully violated the law.”151
There is a substantial factor that makes this practice difficult to
curtail.152 Tax can be an extremely confusing area of the law, and if
seasoned tax professionals disagree as to the merits of an opinion letter, or a
potential tax transaction, it becomes difficult to determine that a particular
transaction would not meet the “more-likely-than-not” standard.153 In
response to the confusion, in February of 2005, the United States Senate’s
completed by accountants); see, e.g., Senate, Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental
Affairs, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Senate PSI Report Targets Firms Involved in
Tax Shelter Industry, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 11, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 28-28, at *10
[hereinafter Senate PSI Report] (exploring the expansive role accountants play in the design of tax
shelters, and though aided by attorneys, it is accountants that chiefly dream up the various tax
products).
147. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 118 (indicating that tax shelters have become a thriving
industry for those involved, and the role of the attorney in this bustling market is largely limited to
opinion letters); see also Rostain, supra note 2, at 92 (emphasizing that lawyers whose involvement in the tax shelter industry included authoring opinion letters profited significantly, and that
the “[o]pinion letters were a sine qua non of tax shelter purchases,” meaning the opinion letter was
indispensable to the success of the tax shelter).
148. Chambers, supra note 5 at 93; see Rostain, supra note 2, at 93 (explaining that a
reasonable chance of surviving an IRS challenge is interpreted as having a greater than fifty
percent chance that the tax treatment would survive the challenge).
149. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 117-18 (stating that it is unethical for a lawyer to issue
an opinion letter expressing the success of a challenge when the transaction is “suspect at best”).
See generally Beckett G. Cantley, The New Tax Shelter Opinion Letter Regulations: Cutting Back
on a Client’s Ability to Rely on the Advice of His Counsel, 18 AKRON TAX J. 47, 73-74 (2003)
(discussing the tactic of deterring a client’s use of counsel).
150. See Rostain, supra note 2, at 93 (“Corporate clients were less interested in the content
of an opinion letter than whether a lawyer was willing to provide one.”).
151. See id. (expanding on the concept that an opinion letter absolves the taxpayer from
liability since the very nature of an opinion letter suggests that the lawyer has “engag[ed] in
disinterested and diligent efforts” to determine the appropriate course of action regarding the
taxpayer’s shelter actions).
152. See id. (discussing the role of attorneys in the tax shelter industry).
153. See id. (discussing the ambiguities in this particular area of the law and how it muddled
the more-likely-than-not determination).
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Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released a detailed report
regarding the prevalence and regularity of abusive tax shelters.154 The
report indicated that the rise in abusive tax shelters was related to the
economy of the 1990s.155 The booming economy led KPMG, one of the
nation’s leading accounting firms, to immerse itself into the design and
marketing of tax products, with which it would often require the presence
of an opinion letter.156 KPMG worked closely with the prestigious law firm
of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (Sidley), relying on the firm for design
assistance, but also for rendering legal opinions, which garnered huge fees
for the firm.157 The United States Senate’s report illustrated that the law
firm’s compensation amounted to $50,000 for each legal opinion it
issued.158 While this number appears excessive, it should be noted that it
was not uncommon for these opinion letters to earn hundreds of thousands
of dollars, with some even topping $1 million.159 With opinion letters
commanding these types of fees, it was not difficult to find an attorney who
would write the letter, even if it was a stretch to conclude the transaction
was more likely than not to survive an IRS challenge.160
B. THE RELIANCE ISSUE
The basic problem with opinion letters is that taxpayers rely on their
contents to avoid an accuracy-related penalty.161 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) now requires a taxpayer to disclose reportable
transactions; an accuracy-related penalty will be assessed to the taxpayer if
he fails to disclose a reportable transaction.162 Prior to the AJCA, there was
154. See, e.g., Senate PSI Report, supra note 146, at *68 (discussing the role of lawyers in
the tax shelter industry).
155. Id. at *5-7.
156. Id.
157. See id. (revealing that Sidley provided about 600 opinions that covered at least thirteen
potentially abusive tax shelters, and this teamwork between Sidley was arranged through a tax
partner of Sidley with KPMG).
158. See id. at 70 (indicating that the more the client saved in tax, the more the law firm
would collect in fees).
159. Rostain, supra note 2, at 94; see Senate PSI Report, supra note 146, at *70 (explaining
that Sidley grossed more than $23 million in fees from writing the opinion letters for KPMG over
a five-year period).
160. See Rostain, supra note 2, at 94 (reasoning that if the lawyer’s conscience caused her to
not issue an opinion letter, the lawyer still knew that “her client could easily find a lawyer who
would” write the opinion letter). It is hard for many lawyers to turn down these large fees when
one knows they will be available to the next lawyer in line. Id.
161. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 126 (arguing the flaw of relying on opinion letters is
eradicated by the change in law from the U.S. Treasury Regulations of 2002 to the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004).
162. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811, 118 Stat. 1418, 1421
(2004); see Chambers, supra note 5, at 125 (explaining that part of the teeth of this new act is the
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no penalty for failure to disclose.163 Rather, failing to disclose reportable
transactions prevented a taxpayer from claiming that any ensuing understatement in tax “was due to reasonable cause, and the taxpayer . . . acted in
good faith.”164 The United States Treasury regulations interpret reasonable
cause as the taxpayer relying on a tax professional’s advice, such as an
opinion letter, expressing that the transaction was more likely than not to
survive an IRS challenge.165 However, the AJCA was not the first
legislation attempting to curtail a taxpayer’s ability to escape penalty via his
reliance on professional advice; rather, Treasury Opinion Regulations
sought to curb some of the defenses taxpayers relied upon in avoiding
accuracy-related penalties as well.166 The Treasury Regulations focused on
transactions that should have been reported, yet were not reported.167
Regarding an underpayment of tax, the Treasury Regulations imposed
accuracy-related penalties for a number of infractions: “negligence or
disregard of rules or regulations, any substantial understatement of income
tax, . . . any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, or any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement.”168 In order to avoid paying
a penalty, the taxpayer’s conduct would have to “fall within the reasonable
cause and good faith exception,” such as relying on an opinion letter.169
But, under the new Treasury Regulations, such reliance on a tax professional’s advice would sometimes be in vain, since not all professional
reliance will equate to a reasonable cause that was made in good faith.170
Ultimately, the Treasury Regulations prevent a taxpayer from automatically
avoiding penalty by claiming that he or she acted in reliance of a

assessment of penalties in the amount of $100,000 for individuals and $200,000 for other entities
for those who fail to disclose a reportable transaction).
163. Chambers, supra note 5, at 125.
164. Id.
165. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4 (2000); see Cantley, supra note 164, at 64-66 (explaining the
frustration over the inconsistencies in the regulation’s attempts to define what constitutes
reasonable cause and good faith exception). Cantley specifically notes that the U.S. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6664-4 states, that “reliance on a professional opinion does not always show reasonable cause
or good faith,” even though it later says that if the reliance on the professional was reasonable,
then the advice will demonstrate that the “taxpayer was . . . acting with reasonable cause and good
faith.” Id. at 65-66.
166. Cantley, supra note 164, at 65-66.
167. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4 (2000); see Cantley, supra note 164, at 65-66 (discussing how the
changes will affect U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.6664-4).
168. See Cantley, supra note 164, at 58-59 (explaining that if one of these factors triggers an
accuracy-related penalty, the severity of the infraction will determine the amount of the penalty).
169. Id. at 59.
170. Id.
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professional opinion.171 The AJCA expands the concept by preventing a
taxpayer from relying on “unreasonable legal assumptions.”172 Essentially,
taxpayers can no longer escape an accuracy-related penalty by shielding
themselves by alleging their reliance on an opinion letter.173 However, as
this part of the note introduced, obtaining a shield from an accuracy-related
penalty is why most opinion letters are commissioned in the first place.174
The attempt to prevent taxpayers from relying on professional advice
raises other concerns.175 While the AJCA attempts to prevent taxpayers
from engaging in abusive tax shelters through removing the reliance shield,
it also raises an inherent problem in prohibiting a client to rely on the
advice of an attorney.176 Additionally, the United States Treasury requires
tax professionals to reveal the names of clients who have engaged in certain
types of transactions.177 The taxpayer may be hesitant to disclose the nature
of the transaction, for fear the attorney will be forced to disclose both the
taxpayer and the nature of the transaction.178 If a client can no longer
satisfy the good faith requirement by relying on his attorney’s advice, that
client’s candor might be compromised in communications with his
attorney.179 The attorney-client relationship is one based upon the free-flow
of information, and the AJCA and the Treasury Regulations run the risk of
compromising the ideals of the attorney-client relationship, even for those
not engaged in abusive tax shelters, in their attempt to prevent taxpayers
from hiding behind the advice of counsel to avoid potential penalties.180
C. STATE REGULATORY BODIES
In order to curb the practice of abusive tax shelters, strictly enforcing
the rules of professional conduct would reduce the number of faulty opinion
171. See id. at 71 (“The new [regulations] require a determination of the taxpayer’s
education and business sophistication in determining whether the reliance on the advice was
reasonable.”).
172. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 126 (using the phrase “canned opinion letters” to
describe the dubious letters that are written on a taxpayer’s behalf to escape an accuracy-related
penalty).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Cantley, supra note 164, at 73-74.
176. Id.
177. 26 U.S.C. § 6112 (2004); see Cantley, supra note 164, at 74-75 (explaining that the
Treasury requires attorneys to register the names of their clients that have engaged in certain types
of transactions, and that this requirement of the Secretary of the Treasury “subrogates the
attorney-client privilege”).
178. Cantley, supra note 164, at 75.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 76 (“If finalized, the Opinion Regs will have a dramatic effect on [the
attorney-client privilege].”).
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letters.181 Additionally, requiring that taxpayers who rely on such opinion
letters to be strictly liable will impair the taxpayers’ liability to hide behind
the protection of an opinion letter.182
1.

Professional Responsibility

Questionable legal opinions issued by attorneys raise a number of
professional conduct concerns.183 For example, the North Dakota Rules of
Professional Conduct require in Rule 8.4(c) that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation.”184 A clear violation of this rule occurs when an
attorney issues an opinion letter that, by its facts, does not have a morelikely-than-not chance of passing an IRS challenge, yet the attorney asserts
in the opinion letter that it does.185 The attorney has misrepresented to the
public, the IRS, and other professionals in the field that this particular
transaction has a fifty percent chance of validity, when in fact it does not.186
Additionally, as previously noted, these opinion letters often garner
rather exorbitant fees.187 The Senate PSI report shows that the law firm
received a minimum of $50,000 for each legal opinion it gave, and that the
amount collected by the firm coincided with the size of the tax saved.188
Sidley spent about 2,500 hours developing and issuing the opinion letters,
and it collected over $23 million in fees, which equates to $9,000 per
billable hour.189 Applying the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct
on fees, Rule 1.5, the lawyers at Sidley appear to have overstepped their

181. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 118 (“[F]ew attorneys have faced disciplinary action for
issuing a fraudulent opinion letter.”).
182. Rostain, supra note 2, at 106.
183. Chambers, supra note 5, at 118.
184. N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2006), available at http://www.court.
state.nd.us/rules/conduct/frameset.htm; see also Chambers, supra note 5, at 118 (explaining the
ethical implications of issuing suspect opinion letters by examining rule 8.4(c) of The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct).
185. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 118 (discussing how this practice “negatively impacts
an attorney’s fitness to practice”). Chambers also discusses how a lawyer who engages in these
opinion letter endeavors “acts dishonestly and misrepresents the realities of such a tax position to
the client.” Id. However, while this may be true, it is often the case where tax attorneys are
commissioned, or sought after to provide the desired legal opinion. Id.
186. Id.
187. Senate PSI Report, supra note 146, at *71. For example, the United States Senate PSI
Report illustrates the fees collected by a prominent law firm that had the benefit of working
closely with KPMG on a number of tax shelter-related transactions. Id. at *69; see Chambers,
supra note 5, at 117 (indicating that for attorneys who engage in the opinion letter trade, there is a
great deal of money to be made).
188. Senate PSI Report, supra note 146, at *70.
189. Id. at *71.
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bounds.190 Part (a) of Rule 1.5 states: “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee,” taking into consideration
the “time and labor required [and] the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved.”191 An argument can be made that the $9,000 per billable
hour is in violation of part (a) of the rule because an unreasonable fee
appears to have been charged.192
While a number of lawyers might wilt in the face of potential
disciplinary action by their respective state bars, attorneys who continue to
issue these assembly-line opinion letters appear undeterred.193 Indeed,
possible public censure or disbarment should be effective methods of
preventing such conduct, but “attorneys who issue these opinions [often] do
not face the consequences of their unethical actions.”194 The Rules of
Professional Conduct, whether in North Dakota or within a broader spectrum, will not be adhered to unless more attorneys who engage in the
issuance of opinion letters for highly questionable tax-related transactions
face the consequences of their actions.195
2.

State Bar Association

While there are a number of measures available to battle the problem
of abusive tax shelters, perhaps one of the most controversial is the
implementation of strict liability for taxpayers who participate in “tax
shelters that [result] in substantial understatements of tax.”196 The New
York State Tax Bar has advocated for such a change.197 One effect of a

190. N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2006), available at http://www.court.state.
nd.us/rules/conduct/frameset.htm (follow “Rule 1.5 Fees” hyperlink); see Senate PSI Report,
supra note 146, at 70-71 (addressing Model Rule 1.5).
191. N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2006) available at http://www.court.state.nd.
us/rules/conduct/frameset.htm (follow “Rule 1.5 Fees” hyperlink); see also Senate PSI Report,
supra note 146, at 71 (citing American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule 1.5).
192. Senate PSI Report, supra note 146, at 70-71.
193. Chambers, supra note 5, at 118 (“[D]isbarment would seem to provide an incentive not
to engage in such conduct.”).
194. Id.
195. See id. (explaining that attorneys involved with issuing opinion letters do not face
consequences).
196. See Rostain, supra note 2, at 106 (explaining that a “shift to strict liability” is not for the
personal gain of attorneys; rather, it is an attempt to “reaffirm authority of lawyers over their
clients”). Rostain argues that taxpayers are calling the shots, goading an attorney into writing an
opinion letter because if that attorney does not, the large fee will go to someone that will write the
letter. Id.
197. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, NYSBA Tax Section Applauds Some AntiCorporate Tax Shelter Proposals, Rejects Others, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 9, 1999, LEXIS,
1999 TNT 82-29, at *2 [hereinafter N.Y. Tax Bar] (advocating for this “radical” reform, giving
weight to the penalties in tax shelters); Rostain, supra note 2, at 106 (“[Strict liability] would alter
the calculus of . . . taxpayers deciding whether to engage in tax shelters.”).
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change to strict liability is that the change puts the onus of the legitimacy of
the transaction on the taxpayer.198 The taxpayer is no longer provided with
an opportunity to hide behind the opinion letter to escape penalty.199
Of course, there is a serious concern that accompanies a strict liability
standard.200 For one, strict liability rids the client of an opportunity to rely
upon the advice of counsel, which is one of the “traditional principle[s]” of
the attorney-client relationship.201 However, one of the other pillars of the
attorney-client relationship is the theory that the lawyer is called upon to
advise the client.202 This pillar, in relation to the opinion letter portion of
the tax shelter industry, has been somewhat eroded because clients have
distorted the reasons a taxpayer seeks an opinion letter; that reason is for
penalty protection.203 Essentially, strict liability would force taxpayers to
seek actual legal advice, because instead of searching for a boilerplate
opinion letter, the taxpayer would be forced to rely on the advice of the
attorney.204 Presumably, if the transaction were one that was not likely to
withstand an IRS challenge, the attorney would advise the taxpayer to avoid
the transaction.205 Presently, tax shelter-seeking individuals wield much of
the power since they are largely absolved from any liability.206 However,
“by creating a market for well-reasoned legal advice that addressed the
legal merits of a transaction, a strict liability regime would strengthen a
lawyer’s capacity to dissuade clients from entering into abusive tax shelter
transactions.”207 A shift to strict liability would move the weight of the
decision making process from the client’s pocketbook to the lawyer’s
expertise.208
198. See Rostain, supra note 2, at 106 (believing that if taxpayers are made responsible for
the advice they rely on, they will then be forced to seek actual, sound legal advice, as opposed to
merely shopping for an opinion letter).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 106-07.
201. See id. at 107 (explaining that in the realm of tax shelters, the client is not really relying
on the attorney’s advice).
202. Id.
203. See Rostain, supra note 2, at 107 (reasoning that because clients come to lawyers for the
opinion letter first, and for advice as to the merits of the transaction second, if at all, the client
does not see an attorney for advice as to whether to engage in the proposed transaction).
204. Id.
205. See id. (stating that strict liability would allow lawyers to deter clients from “entering
into abusive tax shelter transactions”).
206. Id.
207. Id. (positing that a move to strict liability would shift the market forces that were
initially in favor of the taxpayer to the attorney). Without strict liability, taxpayers dictate the
market for legal advice in relation to opinion letters through the large fees. Id. However, if
taxpayers were denied the protection of the opinion letter, the attorneys who gave the best legal
advice as to the merits of the transaction would then be in demand. Id.
208. Id.

284

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:261

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The proliferation of abusive tax shelters in recent years has contributed
to the erosion of the public’s confidence in the United States’ tax system.209
Contingency fees for an accountant’s services, along with opinion letters
sought from an attorney to avoid penalties, create an environment where
taxpayers are able to shelter their money in an illegal manner.210 While
governmental agencies have taken important steps to ameliorate this
problem, there are several missing links in the fight against abusive tax
shelters, some of which can be filled by the lawmakers of North Dakota.211
More specifically, the North Dakota legislature has the opportunity to shore
up the battle against tax shelters by passing legislation that limits how
accountants and lawyers are permitted to operate.
A. CLEARER DEFINITION OF A TAX SHELTER
The fight against abusive tax shelters will not become any easier until
the definition of a tax shelter is more clearly understood.212 A definition
that is neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive needs to be created.213 Of
course, there is the potential that any change in the definition of a tax
shelter will result in a new wave of creative efforts by individuals and corporations to design new shelters around the new definition.214 Regardless
of this concern, enforcement can be made more simplistic if a more userfriendly definition exists.215 Therefore, the definition should include the
taxpayer’s purpose for entering into the transaction, and not much more.216
Ultimately, the transaction should be examined by determining whether the
United States Congress intended the tax result.217 Therefore, a tax shelter
209. See Levin, supra note 9, at *1 (indicating that tax shelters deprive the Treasury of
income).
210. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 6, at 1249-58 (discussing the rise of the tax shelter
industry).
211. See Chambers, supra note 5, at 123-27 (highlighting the potential impact of the
American Jobs Creation Act and the effects it will have on abusive tax shelters); see also Rostain,
supra note 2, at 113-15 (discussing the effects of a shift towards strict liability for taxpayers
involved with tax shelters).
212. See Wang, supra note 6, at 1268 (opining that the definitional problem in curtailing
abusive tax shelters has “become one of [the effort’s] major stumbling blocks”).
213. See Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible
Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 329 (2002) (explaining that a
purpose-oriented approach fails to include some transactions that were only entered into for the
tax result yet excludes others that were entered into specifically for the tax result).
214. Wang, supra note 6, at 1268.
215. Id. at 1241-43.
216. See Schler, supra note 213, at 332 (explaining that the definition should have a “welldefined target”).
217. Id. at 331-32.
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should be defined as follows: a tax shelter is any transaction designed to
achieve an abnormally beneficial tax treatment where Congress did not
intend for the result.218 This may seem broad, but the more specific the
definition becomes the more creative tax professionals become in
attempting to circumvent the definition.219
B. A PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTINGENCY FEES
Because the contingency fee is the cog that drives the tax shelter
wheel, any attempt at addressing the tax shelter problem without
eliminating the contingency fee will be largely ineffective.220 After all,
accountants will have less incentive to develop and market their various tax
products if they are no longer able to collect a percentage of the tax saved
by the client.221 Therefore, it is necessary that both the AICPA and the
North Dakota lawmakers adopt a provision prohibiting the use of contingency fees in tax planning services.222 While the AICPA and North Dakota
have provisions regulating the use of contingency fees, there is no
regulation that addresses the rules’ general use in relation to tax shelters.223
North Dakota law regulates contingency fees by prohibiting them to
audit clients.224 However, prohibition should be expanded to include nonaudit clients.225 Furthermore, the prohibition against contingency fees only
addresses half of the problem in the fight against tax shelters.226 While the
North Dakota State Board of Accountancy, in connection with the AICPA,
requires that contingency fees will not be allowed when dealing with an
audit client, this requirement fails to address one glaring concern: the
spread of abusive tax shelters that are aided by an accountant’s contingency
fee through a nonaudit client.227 Therefore, the regulations governing the
use of contingency fees should make no distinction between those charged

218. See id. (explaining that a tax shelter should be defined by examining three factors:
whether it complies with the Code; whether a tax motivation exists; and whether the “result [is]
unintended by Congress”).
219. Wang, supra note 6, at 1268.
220. Id. (stating that by “regulating accountant compensation,” the “race” to zero out taxes
will be seriously impaired).
221. Id.
222. See id. at 1270 (arguing that while some believe that a blanket provision prohibiting
contingency fees will impede consumer choice, the disallowance of contingency fees will have a
greater impact on the abusive tax shelter industry than it will on consumer choice).
223. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 3-04-04-02 (2007).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Wang, supra note 6, at 1271.
227. Id.
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to audit and nonaudit clients, disallowing contingency fees to both types of
clients in regard to an accounting firm’s tax services.228
Furthermore, North Dakota must amend its existing contingency fee
regulations in order to address any creative terminology efforts employed
by the accountant, broadening the types of fees that are not permitted.229
Instead of only prohibiting the use of contingency fees, prohibiting “valuebased” or “value-added” fees would prevent an accounting firm from
charging audit clients a fee contingent upon a desired result.230 In the end,
any fee that is based upon a percentage of taxes saved must be eliminated,
regardless of what it is called.231 The prohibition of contingency and valuebased fees would address the auditor-independence problem when
contingency fees are charged to audit clients.232
C. STRICT LIABILITY FOR A TAXPAYER’S RELIANCE ON AN OPINION
LETTER IN RELATION TO TAX SERVICES
Taxpayers have traditionally obtained an opinion letter for a tax-related
transaction in order to shield themselves from a penalty, should any
nonconformity in the method of the tax result.233 Because taxpayers are
concerned primarily with obtaining an opinion letter, and less with its
content, a shift toward strict liability would return some authority to
“lawyers over their clients.”234 By following the lead of the New York
State Bar Association’s Tax Section, taxpayers would be required to rely
upon the advice of the attorney giving it, since failure to do so would result
in personal liability for the taxpayer.235 As a result, lawyers would no
longer be patronized for a token opinion letter, but rather, would be sought
for their legal expertise.236

228. Id.
229. See id. at 1272 (explaining that the “Big Four” attempted to “circumvent the AICPA’s
prohibition on contingency fees with audit clients” by reclassifying them).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1267.
232. Stratton, supra note 88, at *2-3.
233. Rostain, supra note 2, at 92-93; see also Chambers, supra note 5, at 117-18 (clarifying
that the attorney’s role in the tax shelter industry is to issue an opinion letter).
234. Rostain, supra note 2, at 106.
235. N.Y. Tax Bar, supra note 197, at *2; Rostain, supra note 2, at 107.
236. Rostain, supra note 2, at 107-09.
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D. ENFORCING THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The blind-eye approach that attorneys have taken in regard to writing
illegitimate opinion letters has persisted without repercussions for too
long.237 While the possible consequences of issuing suspect opinion letters
should be sufficient to dissuade those from the action, few attorneys face
the consequences of issuing “fraudulent opinion letter[s],” even though the
penalties for such conduct include public censure or even disbarment.238
The North Dakota State Bar Association has an opportunity to impair the
continuance of tax shelters, an area where other state bar associations have
failed simply by enforcing their rules of professional conduct.239 This need
not be done in an overly aggressive manner, but rather in a manner that
represents to the public that the state bar association is aware of the
problem and is seeking to halt the injustices it causes.240
VII. CONCLUSION
The abusive tax shelter problem is not a new one.241 Regulatory
agencies have struggled to combat such shelters as long as they have
struggled to define them.242 While individuals and corporations will always
seek new ways to hide or lower their tax liabilities, such efforts can be
minimized by attacking the parties that make such efforts possible.243
Therefore, by removing the contingency fee from the accountant’s arsenal,
and ensuring that an attorney-authored opinion letter is valid, the tax shelter
industry will be greatly impaired.244 These steps are necessary to restore
the integrity of the nation’s tax system. 245
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